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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a model of industrial structure and product 
variety when technology is characterized by increasing returns to 
scale. Unlike theories of increasing returns in markets that are 
contestable, we assume here that an entrant must incur a fixed cost 
prior to entering the market. Pricing and output decisions occur 
subsequently. When entry and pricing decisions are sequential in 
this way the nature of the resulting market equilibrium is quite 
different from that which arises when they are simultaneous. Pro-
duct variety is likely to be lower and there is room for excess profits. 
When there is more than a single producer consumers benefit from 
having majority tastes. Entry deterrence behavior on the part 
of an initial entrant can reduce social welfare. Growth and convergence 
of tastes can benefit or harm consumers. An incentive may arise for an 
efficient firm to sell its technology to relatively inefficient producers. 
1. Introduction 
This paper develops a model of product variety to examine how 
competition among actual and potential producers determines the characteristics 
of products produced. The model is used to consider the effects of market 
size, barriers to entry, and differences in tastes between different groups 
of consumers on the configuration of models produced, welfare, and distribu­
tion of income. The incentive for a firm with a superior technology to 
sell that technology to other actual and potential producers is also 
analyzed. 
We model an industry that produces a differentiated commodity 
that embodies a characteristic that may be represented by a real number. 
Each consumer has an ideal model of that conmodity, and will buy other 
models only when the.price is sufficiently lower. Diversity in tastes 
is represented by differences among consumers in their ideal models. 
In this respect our formulation follows from the location models developed 
by Hotelling (1929), Lancaster (1971), Eaton and Lipsey (1975), Prescott 
and Visscher (1977), Salop (1979), and Lane (1980), among other. We 
depart from these authors, however, in representing the distribution 
of consumer tastes by discrete points rather than a continuum along a 
line or circle. This representation allows us to examine the effects 
of differences in the relative number of consumers with different tastes 
very easily. In contrast, models that represent the distribution of 
consumer tastes as a continuum have difficulty characterizing the distribution 
of tastes as anything but uniform (See Eaton and Lipsey, 1975). Our 
approach, in particular, allows us to distinguish minority and majority 
groups of consumers. 
2 
We follow Prescott and Visscher (1977), Eaton and Lipsey (1978), 
and Lane (1981) in describing equilibrium as the outcome of a two-stage 
process. In the first stage firms conmit themselves to producing a 
particular model of a commodity; they do so sequentially. In the second 
stage firms that have entered detennine prices and outputs_ given the set 
of finns that entered initially and the models they established. We 
assume perfection in the sense that actual and potential producers make 
their entry and model choice decisions calculating correctly the effects 
of their actions on the second stage outcome. 
By treating entry and model choice as decisions that are made 
prior to price and output decisions 9 the choice of model becomes a 
component of a firm's behavior to deter entry. By committ:ing itself 
to produce a particular model a firm can deter entry by other firms. Furthermore, 
because firms enter and establish models before price and output decisions 
are made, free entry does~ enforce average cost pricing. Lancaster, 
(1971), Spence, (1976), Salop (1979), Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982), 
on the other hand, assume that firms may enter and exit in response 
to the price and output decisions of existing firms. As a consequence 
the threat of entry leads to average cost pricing by existing firms. 
Treating entry and pricing decisions as sequential rather than as simultaneous 
actions leads to very different conclusions to a number of questions. 
For example, because a firm may bias its choice of model 
to deter further entry, the threat of entry or expansion in the size 
of a market can reduce welfare. A firm~ by appropriate choice of a 
model, may be able to establish an artificial monopoly. In the consequent 
equilibrium welfare is lower than if the first entrant had been granted 
a franchise monopoly, i.e.• if further entry were prohibited. It is also 
3 
the case that when model choice is a component of entry deterrence strategy, 
the opening of international trade can yield an outcome that is Pareto 
inferior to autarky. We develop this point at greater length elsewhere. 
(Eaton and Kierzkowski, 1982). 
Turning to the second stage of the determination of equilibrium, 
the price and output decisions of firms that have previously entered 
and committed themselves to particular models, we show that there are 
a continuum of Nash-Cournot equilibria when there are two entrants. The 
Nash-Bertrand equilibrium concept• on the other hand, does not yield any 
unless the models they produce are very different and tastes are very 
disparate. This nonexistence problem is similar to that pointed out 
by d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) for the Hotelling model 
in which two firms compete for a continuum of consumers along a line 
segment. These authors show that existence reemerges when disutility 
or transport cost is quadratic rather then linear in distance. Intro.ucing 
quadratic costs does existence when consumers are located 
at discrete intervals, however. To obtain a unique, well-defined equilibrium· 
in prices and outputs we therefore introduce an alternative equilibrium 
concept that assumes more sophisticated beliefs on the part of each firm 
about the reactions of its competitors to its decisions. This alternative 
equilibrium concept, which we call a semi-reactive Bertrand equilibrium, 
does yield a unique solution in pure strategies for the problem we consider 
here. The conjectures on the part of each firm about its rival's behavior 
assumed in our equilibrium definition have the property of being locally 
correct, unlike the Nash-Cournot and Nash-Bertrand conjectures (See Bresnahan, 
1981). 
4 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets 
forth our assumptions about technology and preferences. Section 3 
characterizes the market equilibrium that obtains. section 3.1 treating 
the price and output competition that arises among a given number of 
entrants and section 3.2 the sequential entry of firms in the previous 
stage. Section 4 considers the effects of the threat of entry on 
welfare and the distribution of income. Here we show that the threat 
of entry can reduce welfare. The effect of an increase in the number 
of consumers is discussed in section 5. One result is that an increase 
in the number of minority consumers can have a Pareto worsening effect. 
Another is that when two firms have established production. consumers 
typically benefit from an increase in the number of similar consumers 
-but are adversely affected by an increase in the number of consumers with 
different tastes. Section 6 considers the effect of the dssparity of 
tastes between groups of consumers on their welfare. Up to a point consumers 
benefit from buying in an economy in which other consumers' 
tastes are not too different from their own. The proximity creates more 
rivalry among producers. At some point this rivalry inhibits entry. 
r~wever, thereby leading to monopoly and leaving consumers worse off. 
Section 7 examines the issue of the transfer of technology between 
firms. It is shown that a firm with unique access to a superior technology 
may be able and willing to sell that technology to a subsequent entrant 
if (i) no other entrant would otherwise have entered, (ii) tastes among 
consumers are sufficiently different, and (iii) the number of total consumers 
is sufficiently large. A transfer of technology among two successful 
entrants is sustainable, however;· only when the entrant with the superior 
technology is restricted to the smaller market. Finally, some concluding 
remarks appear in section 8. 
5 
2. Technology and Preferences 
We follow Lancaster (1971) in considering a differentiated commodity that 
embodies some characteristic Z that may be represented by a real number. Pro­
duct differentiation is thus isomorphic to location on a line of infinite 
length. A particular model of the commodity embodies some characteristic z. 
We also assume that production occurs at increasing returns to scale. 
There is a fixed cost K that must be incurred to produce a particular model 
and there is a constant marginal cost of production c. The total cost of 
producing an amount x of a particular model is therefore K + xc. This 
specification of technology is found, for example, in Salop (1977) and Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977). We assume in addition, however, that a firm must incur 
the fixed cost Kand coI11ID.it itself to a particular model before the level of 
output and price are determined. Thus at the time the firm establishes output 
and price the cost K is sunk and the model of the product it produces is 
determined. 
We assume, in keeping with other literature on differentiated products, 
that a single firm can produce no more than a single model of the product. There 
The preferences of each individual i are characterized by a parameter 0. 
l. 
that denotes the individual's ideal model of the commodity. His utility declines 
as the model he consumes becomes more distant from his ideal. For concreteness 
we adopt the form of the utility function used by Salop (1977): 
where Zi is the model consumed by individual i, pi the price paid:for it, and Y 
his income. This functional form implies that the individual demands one unit 
of the commodity if it is available at a price p~~lei-zil and zero units 
6 
otherwise. If more than one variety is available the individual consumes the 




3. Market Equilibrium 
Consider a market that consists of two types of individuals, each char­
acterized by a different taste parameter ei, i = 1, 2 and numbering ni, i = 1, 2. 
Let e ~ 01 .2 
Equilibrium in the market for the commodity is established in a two-step 
process. First, firms incur the fixed cost Kand select models. Second, firms 
determine output levels and prices given the models that were established in 
the first stage. The objective of a potential entrant is to maximize expected 
1
profits. 
3.1 Price and Output Equilibrium 
We analyse the second stage of the process, output and price determination 
given establishes models, first. We then turn to the issue of firm entry. 
Pricing equilibrium is discussed according to the number of entrants. 
3.1.1 A Single Firm 
Consider first the case in which a single entrant has established a model 
z
1 
. It may choose to sell only to the market closer to z (i.e., the one for1 
which lz1 - eil is lower), and e
arn a maximum of [p - lz1 - ail- c] ni - Kor 
else to sell to both markets, in which case he must set p ~ p = p - max 
the second or first option is more attractive as 
(p - c) (1 - A)> lz - e 1-AIZ - e I 
< 1 2 l 2 
where A= n /(n + n A the proportion of type 1 consumers. Assuming that any1 1 2 
production is profitable, selling to the broader set of consumers is more 
attractive when (i) the reservation price pis high relative to marginal cost; 
(ii) the size of the closer market is small relative to the entire marke~ and 
(iii) the closer market is not substantially closer. 
3.1.2 Two firms 
Consider now the situation in which two firms have established models 
8 
z1 and z2 • Assume, for the moment, that 0 ~ z .:::z ,::: 0 • We constrain the two1 1 2 2 
firms to have the same overhead cost K but allow them to have different marginal 
costs, c and c respectively. We assume that the firms must charge both types1 2 
of buyers the same prices, i.e. price discrimination between markets is infeasible. 
The output and pricing decisions of the two firms, given z and z
2 , thus1 
constitute a standard duopoly problem modified to incorporate different product 
characteristics. The standard equilibrium notions applied to such problems are 
the Nash-Cournot and Nash-Bertrand concepts. As is well !mown, they can yield 
very different outcomes. It is also the case that each raises several dif­
ficulties for the problem we consider here. 
Consider first Nash-Cournot equilibrium. Denoting the outputs of the 
two firms as q and q respectively, any outcome q1 
*, q2 *, p1 * , p* 2 , such that1 2 
(2) ql * + q2 * = nl + n2' 
* if < nql l 
J 
> 0 
p* ~ C if q2 * > o2 
9 
-where p* and p " constitute the two firms' respective output prices, is 
1 2 
an equilibrium. An attempt by firm i to increase qi above qi* given qj,* j ~ i, 
will drive the price to zero in whichever market the increment is sold, thereby 
lowering firm i's profits. Reducing qi from qi,* given qj,* j 1 i, will reduce 
profits by p~ - c .• The Nash-Cournot equilibrium concept thus fails to identify 
]. ]. 
a single or even a countable number of outcomes. 
Consider the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium, however. Define 
the distance between the two models. Taking firm l's price as given at p1
, firm 2 
will choose p slightly below 
(3a) p = p - 02 1 
or at 
as 
(3c) (pl - o - c2) (nl + n2) ~ [ max (pl + o,P - I~ - Z2 I) - c2] n2 
If the resulting Pz < c2 , firm 2 will not produce. To break ties we assume that, 
if (3c) obtains with equality, firm 2 chooses (3b). 
In other words, the second firm may sell at the maximum price at which its 
product is attractive to both types of consumers (3a) or else may sell at a price 
attractive only to consumers with tastes relatively closer to the product firm 2 
produces (3b). Condition (3c) determines which will yield higher profits. 
Similarly, firm 1 will choose p slightly below 
or at 
as 
(4c) (p - o - c ) (n + n2) ~ (max (p + o, p - lz1 - 01 1) - c1] n12 1 1 2 
Let f and Pz denote the values of p and p at which (4b) and (4c) both hold with 
1 1 2 
10 
equality. 
Equation (3) constitute firm 2's reaction function to firm l's price while 
(4) is firm l's reaction function to firm 2's price. They are illustrated in 
Figure 1 for the case in whicht + o .:s_ p + le - z 1and f + o < F + lz - e 1.
1 2 2 2 1 1 
The curve ABCD constitutes the second firm's reaction function to p while
1 
A'B'C'D' is firm l's response to p • Along the segment B'C the second firm2 
tries to sell to both types of consumer; p and p both fall to point C. The1 2 
price'p is the price at which (3c) holds with equality. At this point firm 21 
raises its price from C to B, making sales to both types of consumers attractive 
to firm 1. Firm 1 now lowers its price to compete with firm 2 for type 2 consumers. 
Prices are driven down along BC' to C', at which point type 2 consumers are no longer 
attractive to firm 1, since-p is the price at which (4c) holds with equality. Firm2 
1 raises its price from C' to B'. The cycle repeats. The discontinuity of firm 
2's reaction function between B' and C' and firm l's between Band C eliminates the 
possibility of a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium in pure strategies. 
~his discontinuity persists when either -p .:s_ p - jz - e I or, < p1 1 1 2 
as the reader may verify on figure 1. Only when p > p - lz - e I and1 1 1 -
~ > o - I0 - z_ I does an equilibrium obtain. At this equilibrium p = P-1 z - _e 1 
I.2 • 2 :l' 1 1 1 
and p = p - 10 - z 1: each firm sells to its closer market at the monopoly price2 2 2 
in that market. Since-131 and1i both rise with o, equilibrium is more likely to 
2obtain the greater the distance between the two firms. 
Modifying the definition of Nash-Bertrand equilibrium by allowing each f_irm 
to incorporate the other firm's response to its own price leads to a well-defined 
equilibrium in pure stategies, howeve~ that is independent of the firms' distance 
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C A' P1'i 
Figure 1. 
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Definition: If n firms have established models Z, •• , Z , the prices
1 n
{p.,* i = 1, ... , n} constitute a semi-reactive Bertrand equilibrium if and only1 
if for each firm j: (i) given the prices {pi,* i # j} firm j cannot earn a 
higher profit at any price below p~ and (ii) at any price above p~ at least
J . J one 
firm i # j can earn a higher profit at a price below p: or else p~ is the
• J
monopoly price in at least one market. 
The semi-reactive Bertrand equilibrium price vector and the correspon­
ding profit level of each firm are functions of the established models 
Z1 , ••• zn and are denoted {p: (Z), i = 1, .••n) and {n: (Z), i = l, ••• n} 
respectively. 
In this equilibrium each firm takes other firms' prices as given when 
contemplating price reductions. In considering price increases, however, 
each firm takes into account the incentive it may create for any other firm 
to lower its price. At the point of equilibrium this conjecture constitutes 
the locally correct conjectural variation (see, e.g., Bresnahan (1981)). Any 
firm not located very close to another firm can reduce its price slightly with­
out creating an incentive for any other firm to reduce its price. It cannot 
raise its price without creating an incentive for a competing firm to lower its 
price unless it is charging the monopoly price in one market. 
Returning to the two firm case consider firm 2's decision to set p2 , 
given p
1 
• Selling to both markets requires setting Pz below 
(5a) p = p - 02 1 
13 
If firm 2 sells only to its own market at some price p2, it provides an 
incentive to firm 1 to charge just below Pz - o, selling to both markets, 
iff 
The highest price that firm 2 can charge without inducing firm 1 to lower 
its price from p is thus given, from (Sb), by1 
Firm 2 will thus set 
Pz = - o or p2 = p2 asp1 
o - c2) (nl + n2) ~ (p2 - c2) n2 
Given p
2
, firm 1 may choose p just below 
(6a) p = p - 01 2 
and sell to hot:h m::irkPt-i::: - Selling to type 1 rnnc,11m1>rc, only it can ch.arge 
as --much as 
with0ut attracting entry by firm 2. Selling to both markets rather than 
just to type 1 consumers yields higher on lower profits as 
(6c) 
14 
Figure 2 illustrates the two reaction functions implied by (5) and (6). 
If firm 1 charges a price above 
(1 - >-) 
2 
cl+ k2 + (2 - >.) o 
(7) P1 * = 2
1 - >. + >. 
then firm 2 will charge p - o and attempt to sell to both markets. Both1 
prices will then be bid down along DC. Similarly, if firm 2 sells at a price 
above p* 2 , prices will fall along D'C'. If firm 1 sets p below p1 * , firm 21 
will respond by selling p on the segment AB. i-irm 1 can raise its profits by2 
raising its price until p* is reached. Beyond this price firm 2 will respond1 
by lowering rather than by raising its price. 
The threshold price for firm 2 is 
* >.2c + (1 - >.) c (1 + ;\) o_::.._____,;;;__ ____P_z = _ 1 +2(8) 
The price combination p* 1 , p* 2, point Bin figure 2, thus constitutes a semi­
--i. * reactive Bertrand equilibrium: if firm 1 raises its price above p firm 2,
1 
action, firml will thus not raise p • Lowering p , on the other hand, given
1 1 
p2 , cannot raise firm l's profits. Similarly for p2
• 
Several conclusions follow from (7) and (8): 

















The firm selling to tte smaller number of consumers will charge the higher 
price. This firm's market is the less attractive one, and it can charge a 
higher price without providing an incentive for the other firm to enter. 
(ii) If, in addition to c1 = c2 , the two firms produce the same models, 
(i.e., if o = 0) then p1* = p*2 = c; i.e., the reactive Bertrand equilibrium 
price equals the marginal cost of production. This price also corresponds 
to the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium for this case.5 If 6 = 0 while c
1 > c2 , 
the condition p
1
* > c1 would be violated. Firm 1 would not produce while 





(iii) If the two firms have the same market sizes (A= 1/2) then 
(.7") p
1
* = (1/3) c1 + (2/3) c2 + 2 o 
(8") p*
2 = (2/3) c1 + (1/3) c2 + 2 6 
Both firms' marginal costs affect each firm's price; but the firm with the 
lower marginal cost charges the higher price. 
(iv) The greater the difference between the two models the higher the price 
each will charge. 
In equilibrium firm 1 earns a profit 
n - K
1 
while firm 2 earns 
- K 
17 
Not surprisingly, rr rises (and rr falls) as firm 2's cost of production1 2 
rises relative to firm l's (i.e., as c - c rises). The absolute levels2 1 
do not matter. In addition, both firms' profits rise as their products 
become more different (i.e., as o rises). Finally, substituting 
shown that both firms' profits rise when the total market size increases 
(i.e., as n + n rises) holding A constant, and that each firm's profits1 2 
rise as its share of the market (A for firm 1 and 1 - A for firm 2) rises, 
given the total market size, n + n • Thus, even though the firm with the1 2 
larger market must charge the lower price to preclude entry by the other 
firm, its larger sales volume more than compensates it. 
3.1.3' Three or More Firms 
Consider the case in which three firms have established models 2
1
, 22 , 23 
where 0 <Z <Z <23-~..02 . It is straightforward but tedious to establish that in a1 1 2 
reactive Bertrand equilibrium at most only two firms will sell in positive 
amounts or else at least two firms will sell at their marginal cost. If 
(llb) > C 
3 
then only firms 1 and 3 will produce, selling p = c + (2 - z ) and1 2 2 1 
p = c + (2 - z ) respectively. If only (lla) is reversed, firm 2 will3 2 3 2 
displace firm 1, selling to type 1 consumers at p = c - (2 - 2 ), while
3 1 2 1 
if only (llb) is reversed firm 2 will displace firm 3, selling to type 2 
consumers at p = c? - (2 - z ). If both are reversed firm 3 will displace3 3 1 




In the event that (lla) is replaced by an equality while (llb) continues 
to hold both firms 1 and 2 will sell at marginal cost to type 1 consumers. 
Similarly if (llb) is replaced by an .equality while (lla) continues to 
hold both firms 2 and 3 will sell at marginal cost to type 3 consumers. 
Given that all firms have incurred the fixed, swik cost Kat least" one 
firm will earn negative profits. 
19 
3.2 Model Equilibrium 
In Section 3.1 we discussed how in equilibrium outputs, prices and 
profits are determined among a group of established producers. We now 
consider the entry decision itself. We follow Prescott and Visscher (1977) and Lane 
(L9so) (i) in treating entry and model choice as determined prior to price 
and output decisions and (ii) in treating the entry decision as sequential 
rather than simultaneous. This second assumption means that each entrant 
decides whether or not to enter taking as given the model choice of previous 
entrants and assuming that subsequent potential entrants will behave similarly, 
choosing to establish a model or not. taking its own entry and model as given. 
All potential entrants are assumed to maximize profits and to be perfectly 
informed about the distribution of tastes and about each other's technologies. 
The equilibrium number of entrants and their models can be determined 
via the backward induction method of dynamic progranuning. Consider the case 
in which n firms have entered and established models z1 , ••• ,zn. Fo
r this 
set of models to constitute an equilibrium no additional firm can establish 
a model and earn nonnegative profits in the resulting equilibrium; i.e., 
max Il (Z1 , ••• ,Zn;Zn + 1 ) < 0 
~+1 
* Let Zn+ (z1 , ••• ,Z ) denote the value of Zn+ 1 that attain
s V (Z1 , ••• ,Zn)1 0 
The nth firm to enter will choose Zn, taking z1 , ••• ,Zn _ 
and the1 
* function Zn+ 1 (Z1 , ••• ,Zn) as given, to attain 
20 
max {rr(z1 , ... ,Zn,Zn




denote the value of Z that attains V(Z
1
, ... ,Z 1). In general, the i'th n n 
entrant chooses its model Zito attain 
max {II(Z , ••• ,z.
1z. . l. 
l. 
where, as before, 
), ••• ,Zn+ 1( )) = 
) , ... ,z ( ))
n 
as long as V(z1 , ••• zi,zi + 1 (z1 , ••• Zi), ••• ,Zn(z1 , ••• zn _ 1)) < 0 
We may now establish some propositions about the models that will be 
established in a market with two classes of consumers. 
First, these will be at most two producers. Section 3.1.3 establishes 
that in a market with three producers at most two will sell positive amounts 
or else two firms will sell at marginal cost. In either case at least one 
6firm will sustain negative profits. This firm would not choose to enter. 
Consider now the second entrant's decision. It takes the first firm's 
entry and its model, Za, as giveff, and chooses its model, Zb, to maximize 
its profits. It need not concern itself with further entry. If it sets 
Zb > Za it will realize profits of 
21 
while, if it set Z < Z its profits areb a 
The first expression is maximized at Zb = 02-w
hile the second is maximized 
at zb = 0 •7 Thus, given za, firm 2 sets zb = e or Zb = 01 1 2 
as n ~(za, 0 ) ~ rr (za, e ), assuming that the larger is nonnegative. Other­2 1 2 1 
wise it does not enter at all. In either case there will be no further 
entry. 
Consider now the first firm's entry decision, which is considerably more 
complicated. It must consider (i.) whether it can preclude further entry; 
(ii) if so, if it is profitable to preclude further entry; and (iii) if it 
does preclude further entry, whether it should sell to one or to both types 
of consumers. 
The first entrant can preclude further entry if for some value of 
Z ,V(Z ) =max [IT(Z ,0 ),IT~(Z ,0 )] < 0 
a a a 2 a 1 
or, equivalently, if there exists a Z e (Z, 2) where a -a a 
and 
2 
(15b) za = 01 + lA(Cb - ca)+ (1 - A+ A ) K/nl ]1<2 - A) 
That such a Z exists is more likely (i) the more similar are tastes (i.e., 
a 
the smaller 0 - e ), (ii) the stronger the first entrant's cost advantage2 1 
(cb - ca), and (iii) the larger the fixed cost K. 
22 
If the first entrant does not block further entry, then the second 
entrant will choose either Zb = 01 
or Zb = 02
• If the second entrant 
chooses Zb = 01 the first entrant's profit are maxim
ized when Za = 0 .
2 
Conversely, when Zb = 0 2 the fir
st entrant's profits are at a maximum 
when Za = 01 . If the first firm sets Za = 01 the best th
e second firm 
can do is to set Zb = 0 2 • Thus if the first f
irm does not deter entry 






Therefore, in an equilibrium in which both entrants are present Z = 0a 1 
We now enumerate the types of outcomes that can occur. We do not 
attempt to provide conditions that lead to each one. Instead we discuss 
some examples. 
(i) No entry. If both (p -·c) n1 - K and [ p - (02 0)- c] (n1 + n2) - K 
are negative there will be no entry. Here 0 = 102 - e1 I / 2, the model 
halfway between tastes in the two markets. 
(ii) One entrant selling to.!. single market. 
There may be only one firm selling to only type one consumers. With no 
further entry,to maximize profits it will establish Za = 01 or, if it is 
necessary to deter entry, set Za > 01 
• For the case in which A= 2/3 and 
7K
ca= cb, the firm can set Za = 01 
and not deter entry iff 02 - el~ 15n
27K
- -- to deter anIf this condition does not obtain it must set Za-
> 02 15n
2 
entrant from establishing Zb = e 2 • The single ent
rant's profits are given 
by 
(16) II = [p (Z - 0) - c] n - K
a a l 1 
(iii) One entrant selling~ both markets. A single firm may sell to 
both types of consumers. With no further entry, to maximize profits it will 
establish Z = 0 but may find it necessary to set Z < 0 to detera a 
23 
entry. For the case in which >.. = 2/3 and ca= ~ the firm can set Za = 0 
7Kand not deter entry iff 0 - 0 < r:::--. If this condition does not obtain
2 1 - olll 
it must set Z < - 0 + -7K to prevent an entrant from establishing Zb = 01 . a - 1 12n1 
The single entrants profits are given by 
(17) Ila= [p - (0 - Za) - c](n + n ) - K2 1 2 
7KAssuming that 0 - 0 ~lSn , so that entry deterrence is possible at any2 1 
2 
location between 0 and 0, the single entrant will prefer to set Za = 0
1 1 
and sell only to type one consumers or to set Z = 0 and sell to both types
a 
of consumers as (0 - 0) ~ 2/3 (p - c).
2 
(iv) Two entrants, each selling to a single market. The first entrant 
may not be able to deter further entry (as would be the case if, for instance, 
7K
>.. = 2/3 and 0 - 0 > ) or else riot find it profitable to deter further2 1 12n2 
entry. In this case the first entrant will establish Z = 0 and the second 
a 1 
Zb • 02. 
Thus, like d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) we find that when two 
firms do enter there is no tendency for them to locate adjacent to one another, 
contrary to Hotelling's (1929) "principle of minimwn differentiation." 
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4. Threat of Entry, Welfare and Distribution 
According to the contestable markets theory of increasing returns to 
scale industries, the threat of entry serves the desirable role of enforcing 
efficiency (see, e.g., Baum.al, 1982). If increasing returns take the form of 
sunk fixed costs, however, the threat of entry can lead to socially wasteful 
location decisions. Welfare may be raised by the elimination of all potential 
entrants, i.e., by establishing a franchise monopoly. 
Consider the case in which there is only a single entrant selling to a 
single mark.et. Social welfare is at a maximum when Za = e1 , i.e., wh
en the 
model produced by the single entrant corresponds to the ideal model of the 
consumers it sells to. The threat of additional entry may cause a single 
entrant to modify its product in the direction of the tastes of consumers in 
another market to preclude entry by a firm servicing that mark.et. In the 
resulting equilibrium the single entrant will not sell to this second market, 
yet its presence will have modified the model produced. The firm's profits 
The threat ofare consequently lower while no consumer's welfare is higher. 
entry thus, leads to s~cially waste(~l_strateg~c behavior on the_p~rt 0£° a single· 
Social welfare would be higher if further entry were prohibited.entrant. 
The first entrant's decision to modify its model constitutes the 
Another example ofestablishment of a artificial monopoly. (Dixit 1980). 
such behavior by·an initial entrant, which has received some attention, is 
the first entrant's decision to invest in capacity beyond the level that 
is efficient to produce the optimal monopoly output, thereby lowering short run
 
marginal cost and enhancing the first entrant's competitive position vis-a-vis 
potential entrants. (See, e.g., Spence, 1977; Dixit, 1980; Eaton and Lipsey 
1980, 1981; Brander and Spencer, 1982.) In this case, however, under an 
artificial monopoly, price and output may be closer to their socially optimal 
levels than under a franchise monopoly (i.e., with restricted entry). The 
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threat of entry in this case can engender strategic behavior that is welfare 
improving. When this artificial monopoly is achieved by biasing model 
choice, however, it is not the case that entry deterrence lowers effective 
price and raises output. It is purely wasteful. 
We discuss the effects of international trade on welfare at length elsewhere 
(Eaton and Kierzkowski, 1982). It is worth mentioning here that in the case 
just considered a social gain results from prohibiting trade between markets. 
With trade prohibited two firms rather than one can establish production, each 
servicing one market. The first entrant will. earn a higher profit, establishing 
z = e and charging p, while a second entrant with z = e
2 
, also charging p,1 1 2 
will earn positive profits as well. Prohibiting trade thus constitutes a 
superior policy to precluding further entry while both policies dominate laissez­
faire. 
Entry deterrence can also lead to a redistribution of income from a 
firm to consumers in the larger market. This occurs when a single firm sells 
to both markets but biases his product toward the taste of consumers in the 
larger market to preclude further entry. Consumers in the larger market 
consequently pay a price below their reservation price 
the firm's profits are below maximum profits if further entry were precluded. 
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5. Growth and Welfare 
The literature on increasing returns to scale provides many examples 
in which growth in the form of an increase in the number of consumers raises 
welfare. 9 In the model developed in sections 2 and 3 the effect of market 
growth on welfare is ambiguous, and an increase in the number of consumers 
can result in a Pareto inferior outcome. 
Consider the case in which there is a single entrant selling only to 
the larger market. An increase in the number of consumers in the smaller 
market may, given the model produced by the single entrant, allow a second 
entrant to establish production and sell to the smaller market. To deter 
entry the first entrant may modify its product to correspond more closely 
to the taste of consumers in the smaller market, even though in the resulting 
equilibrium no sales are made to those consumers. The single entrant must sell 
to the larger market at a lower price. Its profits are consequently lower while 
no consumer's utility is higher. Thus growth in the size of the smaller market 
yields a Pareto inferior outcome. 
Welfare does not fall monotonically as the number of consumers in the 
smaller market increases, however. Eventually, entry deterrence becomes un­
profitable or infeasible so that two firms enter, each producing the ideal 
model for one market. At this point further increases in the number of type 2 
consumers benefit both firms and type 2 consumers while harming type 1 consumers. 
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6~ Taste Differences and Welfare 
The disparity of tastes in an economy can be represented by the distance 
between the ideal models of type 2 and type 1 consumers. It is interesting 
to compare consumer utility and firm profits in an economy where tastes are 
disparate (0 - 0 is large) with utility and profits in an economy of equal2 1 
size where tastes are similar (0 - 0 is small). Alternatively, if the model
2 1 
characteristic Z corresponds literally to its location on a line and if trans­
portation costs are linear in distance a decrease in 0 - e may be interpreted
2 1 
as a reduction in transportation costs. 
Consider first the case in which markets are sufficiently large and tastes 
everywhere sufficiently disparate to allow entry by two firms. Prices will be 
lower in the economy in which tastes are similar. Consumers will thus be better 
off and firms worse off than in the economy in which tastes are disparate. 
In the case in which tastes are everywhere sufficiently similar to allow 
only one entrant, the producer will never earn less where tastes are more 
similar while in most configurations consumers are unaffected by the difference 
in taste disparity. An exception arises when the single firm sells to both 
markets but biases its model toward the taste of the larger market to deter 
entry. The bias will be less where tastes are similar and consumers in the 
larger market are consequently worse off. 
Finally, if the economy in which tastes are disparate can sustain two 
producers while the one in which they are similar can sustain only one, 
consumers benefit from taste disparity. The successful entrant in the economy 
where tastes are similar will earn more than either firm in the economy where 
tastes are disparate. In summary,fleither firmsnor consumers nec~ssarily 
benefit or lose from a reduction in the disparity of tastes. 
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7. Technology Transfer 
We have assumed that each entrant has access to a potentially dif­
ferent technology. In this section we consider conditions under which 
a sale of technology from an efficient to an inefficient producer is 
sustainable in a market equilibrium. 
Consider a situation in which there are many potential producers. 
Only one, firm a, however, has access to a technology that allows it to 
produce at marginal cost c. The rest only have the ability to produce at 
a 
marginal cost cb > Ca• We assume that firm a is always the initial 
entrant, possibly because it can sell at a price below cb and sustain non­
negative profits, thus under-bidding any previous entrant. 
7.1 Technology Transfer that Leads to Entry 
We first consider a situation in which, at the initial levels of ca and cb, 
the market is sufficiently small to allow firm a to preclude entry by establishing 
any model between 0
1 
and 0. Firm a's profits are 
Consider the case of a potential entrant purchasing for an amount T the 
ability to produce, at marginal cost c.a We assume that its entry to the 
market would lead to a new, long-run equilibrium in which Za = 0 and Zb = 0 ;1 2 
i.e., we assume that the initial entrant maintains the ability to choose the more 
popular model. We also assume that in the new equilibrium price competition 
- 10 
occurs so that p < p and p < p: Profits are thena b 
0 )7
(19) 1 1 n -K+T 
J 1 
(20) 




a T such that IT~> IT· and IT'> o
a- a-- b- · Since there are many potential 
entrants but only one producer w
i th access to the efficient technology, 
Tis determined bY the zer.o profit condition for a potential entrant; i.e. 
or 
(21) T = -K+n
2 
hSubstitution (24) into (22) indicates tat sustainability requires 
(22) 1 + 211. - 2>..
2 
)
( 2 (02 - 01) (nl + n2) - 2K > IT
1 - >.. + >.. a 
Inspection of this condition reveals that a transfer is more likely to be sustain-
able the larger taste differences (02 - 01) and
 the overall market s1.·ze (nl 
+ n2,) 
and the smaller the entry cost K and the monopoly markup (p _ c ). The lasta 
relationship indicates that, ceteris paribus, a technology transfer is less 
likely to occur when the technology is highly ef,ficient. 
7.2 Technology Transfer Between Successful Entrants. 
Consider now the case in which~ is sufficiently low relative to c
a to 
allow a second entrant in the absence of a transfer of technology. 
In this case, 
prior to any transfer, profits of the two firms are 
>..(c - c) + (2 - A) (0 - 01)]b a · 2 n = K(.23) IT 
a 
= [ 
1 - A+ >.. 2 l 
- 0 ) ] 
=[ 
(1 - >..) (c - cb) + (1 + A) (0 - KITb _____a____________2___1_ n
(24) 2 . 2 
1 - A+ A 
For a transfer to occur the price T of the technology must satisfy 
IT'> IT
a a 
and ITb > ITb, where IT~ and. ITb continue to be defined by ( 19' and ~O
), respec-
tively. Continuing to assume that the number of potential entrants
 with 
technology cb is large, and assuming now that any purchaser of the 
technology 
necessarily becomes the second entrant (perhaps because it could se
ll below 
cb and still realize a profit) we define T by the condition Ilb = ITb so that: 
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(1 - A) (cb - ca) 
T = 21 - A+ A 
The first producer will .find a technology sale profitable iff 
rr; ~Ila oriff A< 1/2. Since we assumed initially that n
1 
~ n2 the 
efficient producer will transfer technology only if the two markets 
are of equal size, and then be indifferent between selling and not 
selling. More generally, an efficient producer can profit from selling 
a more efficient technology to a firm in a larger market, even if the two 
firms affect each other's price. It will not sell to a competing firm in a 
smaller market, however. 
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8. Conclusion 
This paper has developed a model of market structure which 
combines elements of the theory of imperfect competition and oligopoly. 
As in models of imperfect competition there are, ~ ~• a large number 
of potential producers that are, in principle, free to enter. ~ post, 
however, the number is fixed. The nature of competition is thus different 
from that in models in which markets are contestable in that there is 
a fixed cost that must be assumed before prices are determined. This 
distinction implies that there is scope both for positive profits and 
strategic entry-deterrence behavior. 
In order to characterize equilibrium fully in closed fonn we 
have made some very s~ecial assumptions about tastes and techriology. 
Nevertheless, a number of our results are likely to remain under a more 
general specification. First, oligopolistic competition among firms 
is likely to benefit consumers whose tastes are in the majority. To 
avoid penetration by other firms a firm selling to consumers in a large 
market will have to charge a relatively lower price. Conversely, a firm 
selling to a small number of consumers can charge a higher price without 
providing an incentive for another firm to lower its price in order to 
sell to both markets. Second, entry deterrence behavior may affect the 
characteristics of products produced. One possible modification is 
toward the taste of consumers in a small market to preclude the emergence 
of a second entrant catering to that market 9 even though no sales are 
consequently made to the smaller market. In this case the threat of 
entry lowers welfare. A second _possible modification is toward the taste 
of consumers in larger market by: a firm selling to two markets. Here 
the threat of entry redistributes income from the firm toward consumers 
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in the larger market. A third result is that market growth can exacerbate 
the distortions imposed by entry deterrence behavior. Fourth, consumers 
benefit from the greater intensity of competition in an economy where 
other consl.lillers are not too different from them as long as the number of 
producers remains the same. When similarity of tastes among consumers 
breeds such intense price competition among firms that entry is discouraged, 
however, consumers lose. Finally, when consumers differ sufficiently 
in their tastes and when the number of consumers is sufficiently 
large an incentive arises for an efficient firm to sell its superior 
teclmology to other firms. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. In treating the model choice and pricing decisions as sequential rather 
than simultaneous our treatment is isomorphic to Prescott and Visscher's 
(1977) model of location choice. See also Lane (1980). 
2. The non-existence of Nash-Bertrand equilibrium for the case in which the 
two firms are located less than some critical distance apart resembles the result 
of d'AspreI!lont, Gabszewiczand Thisse (1979) on the non-existence of a solution to 
the Hotelling model. They show that existence reemerges when transport costs are 
made quadratic rather than linear. This i~ not the cas~ whan individuals are 
located at distinct points rather than along a continuum. 
3. In his analysis of insurance markets, Wilson (1977) provides an example 
in which, when firms have more sophisticated beliefs about other firms' re­
actions, equilibrium in pure strategies exists when it fails to obtain under 
a Nash specification. 
We assume throughout that pis sufficiently high to insure that p > p·* 
1 
and p- > .p;. If the first inequality is violated p = p and if the second is
1 
-violated p2 = p. Wealso assume that p * ~ c and p * ~ c • Otherwise, firm 11 1 2 2 
or firm 2 will not produce in equilibrium as the first or second in-
equality fails to obtain. 
5. See Bresnahan (1981) and Grossman (1981). 
6. Only models in the interval [01 , 0 ] are of interest. Consider an equi­2 
librium in which there is a firm producing a model a distanced above 0 
2 
(below 01). There is a corresponding equiiibrium in which that firm locates 
at 02 (01), charges a price greater by an amount d, and maintains its previous 
level of sales. Its profits are consequently higher. The firm would have 
chosen this location over the location outside the interval. 
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' *It is the case the cb cannot be so low relative to c that p < c in the 
a a a 
resulting equilibrium. Otherwise, the second entrant would sell to both markets 
in·equilibrium. The first entrant would experience a loss and consequently would 
not have chosen to enter. Again, we are assuming that in this equilibrium the 
level pis not binding. 
8. Again, this result assumes that c is not much higher than~• If 
8 
the first entrant has a strong cost disadvantage (i.e., if c >> cb):
8 
then the second entrant may nevertheless choose Zb • e and sell at1 
p = ca even though Z.a = 01 • In this case the first entrant would 
have chosen Za = 02 • 
Given that Za = 0 and Zb = 02 , a.third entrant cannot establish1 
production and earn a positive profit unless it has a strong cost advantage. 
There is consequently no incentive for a firm to delay entry. See 
Shaked and Sutton (1982) for a model in which firms do have an incentive 
to delay establishing a model. 
9. Hart (1979) and Novschek (1980) show that with free entr)l Coumot 
equilibrium among firms converges to competitive equilibrium and a 
Pareto optimum. In these models entry and pricing decisions are sitrn.1ltaneous 
so that free entry enforces average cost pricing. 
10. If after the transfer, the two producers could charge pin their 
markets, a technology transfer would necessarily be sustainable. 
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